University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
12-2-2010

Vertical Restraints, Dealers with Power, and Antitrust Policy
Herbert J. Hovenkamp
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Evidence
Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Litigation Commons, and
the Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation Commons

Repository Citation
Hovenkamp, Herbert J., "Vertical Restraints, Dealers with Power, and Antitrust Policy" (2010). Faculty
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1845.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1845

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

Hovenkamp

Intrabrand Restraints and Dealer Power

Nov., 2010, Page 1

Vertical Restraints, Dealers with Power, and Antitrust Policy
Herbert Hovenkamp *
Introduction
Although a vertical distribution restraint resembles a dealer cartel in that both limit
intraband competition, a manufacturer restraining the distribution of its product shuns
the excess dealer profits a dealer cartel would seek. 1 Accordingly, a knowledgeable and
uncoerced manufacturer who restricts rivalry among dealers must do so for some other
reason, such as to facilitate dealer services. In fact, however, manufacturers have often
restrained intrabrand competition—especially through resale price maintenance —not to
achieve more effective distribution but rather to appease dealer interests in excess
profits.
The shorthand term “dealer power” embraces all the circumstances that induce a
manufacturer to accommodate those dealer interests. 3 The most obvious circumstances
are dealer cartels or individually powerful dealers with something approaching
monopsony power, but dealers may get their way in other market situations as well. We
shall also see that a manufacturer may willingly exchange such excess profits on its
brand for something it wants in return, such as dealer refusals to handle rival brands.
Nevertheless, it is convenient to use the shorthand expressions “coercion” of an
“unwilling” manufacturer to describe its adoption of a distribution restraint that brings
dealers more profit than necessary for efficient distribution of a brand. Accordingly, a
coerced restraint may result from ordinary bargaining between dealers and
manufacturers. The antitrust objection to such restraints is not that the manufacturer is
coerced but that competition is limited for an illegitimate end.
Whatever the social benefits of a distribution restraint that serves a manufacturer's
self-interest, a competition-limiting restraint extracted by dealer power can be
anticompetitive. Of course, even a dealer cartel need not be seeking excess profits or
the quiet life, for the resulting vertical restraint might be identical to that which a wiser
manufacturer would have adopted on its own. But such a beneficial effect must be
doubted in situations where a manufacturer does not itself desire it.
In all events, vertical restraints reflecting dealer power could well be ignored by
antitrust law if they were rare in occurrence, insignificant in magnitude, or readily
detected and remedied under other branches of antitrust law. But we doubt that dealer
*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.

1

See 8 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1603 (3d ed. 2011), for the
proposition that a manufacturer ordinarily maximizes its profits by selling at a price satisfactory to itself
and by encouraging maximum competition among dealers so that their profit margins will be as low as
possible, consistent with the continued performance of their distribution functions.
3

The term “dealer cartel” could do as well when defined with similar breadth, but its customary
meaning of an express concert among dealers tends to push out of mind the broader concept of dealer
power that is critical for the present purpose.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681921
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power is that rare and are troubled by an apparent history of price-enhancing resale
price maintenance for the benefit of dealers. At least some of the claimed justifications
for it actually reflect dealer power, and antitrust rules controlling horizontal combinations
cannot themselves prevent those distribution restraints that result from dealer power.
The most anticompetitive situation is an express dealer cartel that covers all rival
brands, fixes prices or allocates markets, and enlists the several manufacturers both to
restrict their dealers' prices or markets in accordance with decisions of the cartel and to
enforce those restrictions against wavering cartel members and nonmembers alike. But
such explicit and detailed concert among so many actors is likely to be detected and
then condemned as a horizontal conspiracy among the dealers. Such condemnation will
terminate the cartel and punish its members. The law would then have no need to
address the vertical restraints, for the manufacturers would cheerfully abandon them
once freed of the coercive cartel.
Much less certain to be detected, however, is the informal or loosely organized
dealer group that pressures a manufacturer to eliminate interbrand competition. For
example, dealers acting individually but with awareness of each other's actions may
press the manufacturer to adopt resale price maintenance or other distribution
restraints. Furthermore, individual dealers, each acting in its own interest and without
regard to other dealers' behavior, may be able to compel a manufacturer to impose a
vertical restraint on intrabrand competition.
Of course, as the source of such pressure becomes less widespread, dealer power
over a manufacturer also declines. And as the restriction of competition becomes less
complete, the dealers' ability to profit from it, and therefore their incentive to secure it,
declines. In addition, interbrand competition might prevent the restraint from having any
substantial effect, and unrestricted dealer rivalry in the provision of services might erode
any excess profit. Accordingly, industrywide restraints that also limit service competition
are most dangerous. Nevertheless, incomplete restrictions on competition may remain
attractive to dealers who have the power to obtain them —perhaps even more attractive
than lower wholesale prices. 5
Distribution restraints, especially resale price maintenance, have sometimes resulted
from dealer power rather than from the manufacturer's independent and unilateral
interest in effective distribution. Moreover, the driving political forces behind “fair trade”
legislation permitting resale price maintenance 6 were not manufacturers but
associations of retailers or wholesalers; the most active of these was the National

5

A powerful dealer pressing for lower wholesale prices can expect that other strong dealers will do
the same and that subsequent intrabrand competition among them will push the larger wholesale-retail
margin back to competitive levels. Protecting dealer margins through resale price maintenance may thus
be more attractive to them. Moreover, the manufacturer might conclude that lowering its wholesale
prices—especially if rival manufacturers do the same—would impair its profits more than fixing resale
prices.
6

See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1629.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681921

Hovenkamp

Intrabrand Restraints and Dealer Power

Nov., 2010, Page 3

Association of Retail Druggists. 7
Indeed, Congress enacted such legislation—and also, at approximately the same
time, the Robinson Patman Act 8—not to help manufacturers assure effective distribution
but to protect dealers, especially smaller ones, from more intensive competition for
consumer patronage. In addition, dealer associations actively sought to induce
manufacturers to fix resale prices. Although strong efforts by associations in the
grocery, hardware, and tobacco businesses were largely unsuccessful, dealer
associations had considerable success in the liquor trade, and the druggists' association
obtained significant price restraints on proprietary drugs, surgical and related supplies,
and those toiletries that were not sold extensively by other types of stores. 9
Around 1930, the Federal Trade Commission studied attitudes toward resale price
maintenance 10 and found that wholesalers almost unanimously favored the restraint as
a means to thwart the competition that they and their retailer customers faced from
department stores, supermarkets, chain stores, and mail order houses. Among retailers,
resale price maintenance was generally opposed by chains, department stores, and dry
goods stores, while it was generally favored by druggists, grocers, jewelers, stationers,
and hardware stores. Even commentators sympathetic to the potential efficiency of
distribution restraints acknowledge that such restraints were often sought by retailers
and wholesalers in order to insulate themselves from competition 11 rather than to serve
the manufacturers' interests in effective distribution. 12
This pattern has also been observed in other countries. Although many
manufacturers eventually became members, independent retailers were the driving
7

On the role of this association in early resale price maintenance decisions, see Herbert Hovenkamp,
Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 at 331-348 (1991). For the possibility that such dealers were
motivated by concern about free riders and similar possible efficiencies, see discussion infra. In any
event, one would not infer that the dealers turned to the political process because they lacked the power to
coerce manufacturers, for even those able to extract resale price maintenance from reluctant
manufacturers first needed legislation to legalize the restraint.
8

On the anticompetitive consequences of that statute, which was often hostile toward efficient
distribution, see 14 Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law ¶¶2302, 2340, 2342 (2d ed. 2004).
9

Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
140-144 (FTC Bureau of Economics 1983). See also Edward O. Correia, Resale Price Maintenance—
Searching for a Policy, 18 J. Legis. 187 (1992).
10

Federal Trade Commission, Report on Resale Price Maintenance (Part I 1929; Part II 1931); see
Overstreet, supra, at 129-134.
11

Overstreet, supra, at 134.

12

It is not inconsistent that some manufacturers favored such restraints. Interestingly enough, their
most common justification was that resale price maintenance protected the goodwill they had built up
through heavy advertising expenditures. Yet, if manufacturers and not dealers provided the advertising,
dealer discounting could interfere with brand goodwill only through doubtful loss-leader or snob image
effects.
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force behind the United Kingdom's Proprietary Articles Trade Association (PATA), which
was formed in 1895 to protect dealer margins from the growing competition of
department stores and chains. Competition from the latter became troublesome to the
independent retailers when consumers began to judge the quality of branded goods on
the basis of manufacturer advertising rather than, as previously, upon a retailer's
recommendations. Once some manufacturers signed resale price maintenance
agreements with PATA, their rivals felt compelled to do likewise, lest dealers discourage
consumers from buying their products or refuse to handle them altogether. 13
In Sweden as well, resale price maintenance seemed to serve the interests of
dealers rather than those of manufacturers. Following legal abolition in 1954, the
number of wholesalers and retailers declined, and their average size and efficiency
rose. 14
Although the monograph from which these examples are drawn acknowledges that
dealer power explains resale price maintenance on many items in the United States and
abroad, the author correctly cautions that dealer power “should not automatically be
assumed to fit other resale price maintenance applications without careful study of the
relevant circumstances.” 15 Yet the study also acknowledges that distribution has at
times been restrained on goods “for which any straightforward application” of the usual
efficiency justifications for such restraints “seems strained.”16
Other commentators have also observed that minimum resale price maintenance
often occurred in the distribution of products for which dealer service or other dealer
contributions to product goodwill were unimportant: gasoline, auto parts, toiletries,
paper, beer, men's shoes, rainwear, women's and children's clothing, underwear, 17
cosmetics, perfumes, over-the-counter drugs, tobacco products and accessories, simple
photographic supplies, drugstore watches and clocks, eyeglass lenses, and small
13

Overstreet, supra, at 149-155. By 1956, about 44 percent of consumer goods and services purchased
by households in the United Kingdom were sold at fixed or suggested resale prices. In that year, the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act outlawed collective enforcement of resale price fixing by manufacturers.
Later, the Resale Prices Act of 1964 outlawed resale price maintenance altogether and even forbade
manufacturers to refuse to supply a dealer based on its actual or prospective price cutting. Id. at 152-154.
14

Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
156-157 (FTC Bureau of Economics 1983).
15

16

Id. at 160.

Id. at 162. Although one of the most common efficiency claims today is the control of free riders on
substantial services provided by dealers, free riding is not the only impediment to important dealer
services. In any event, the present suggestion is that distribution has been restrained in circumstances that
are difficult to explain by any of the potentially “legitimate” objectives analyzed in 8 Antitrust Law
¶¶1611-1619 (3d ed. 2011).
.
17
Stanley I. Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 Antitrust Bull. 401, 428 (1985):
“[E]conomists appear to have been forcing the special service theory into areas where it does not apply.”
That article does suggest, however, that other explanations may sometimes apply. Id. at 428-431.
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appliances. 18 The high level of concentration in local markets for eyeglass lenses was
noteworthy, as was the higher incidence of such restraints for small appliances, which
did not require dealer demonstration or service, than for major appliances, which did. In
these instances, collusive pressure by dealers may best explain the restraints. 19
Moreover, in major appliances intrabrand competition was typically restricted only by
manufacturers with “small market shares or weak positions”20—suggesting either dealer
power relative to those particular manufacturers, the latter's greater need for point-ofsale services, or for dealer recommendations to consumers.
Resale price maintenance tends to produce higher consumer prices than would
otherwise be the case. 24 The evidence is persuasive on this point. 25 Indeed, the
restraint that did not hold a product's price above the level that would otherwise prevail
would be unnecessary; its very purpose is to prevent price cutting. So we should, of
course, expect prices to be higher with resale price maintenance than without it.
Although this history suggests that anticompetitive dealer power accounts for some
vertical restraints, a further aspect of this experience deserves emphasis. Dealer
associations usually represented multibrand dealers and sought restricted distribution
not simply on one brand of a product but on most brands, for eliminating competition in
one brand would not fully insulate dealers from competition so long as rival brands were
available in free competition. Stated another way, the multibrand dealers wished to
minimize competition in the retailing function and therefore sought distribution restraints
on all significant brands. We consider later whether broad market coverage of a
distribution restraint is necessary before we need to worry about dealer power.

18

E. Raymond Corey, Fair Trade Pricing: A Reappraisal, 30 Harv. Bus. Rev. 42 (Sept.-Oct. 1952) at
47; Marina Lao, Free-Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price
Maintenance (July 14, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024221&rec=1&srcabs=951609; Robert Pitofsky, In
Defense of Discounters: the No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 geo.L.J.
1487 (1983). See also Frederic M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance 552 (3d ed. 1990) (observing that “relatively few products” appears to require the kinds of
dealer service that the free rider explanation cites).
19

See id. at 51-52; and Richard E. Caves, Economic Models of Vertical Restraints: Market Failure and
Market Power 21 (Harvard Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 754, 1980).
20

See Caves, supra, at 21.

24

To the extent that fixed resale prices induce incremental dealer services that consumers value more
than the incremental price, they receive a better product (goods plus services) for the higher price.
25

See Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical
Evidence 106-117 (FTC Bureau of Economics 1983). Although numerous flaws in those studies were
pointed out, those flaws related to whether price decreases, after the end of resale price maintenance,
improved consumer welfare—that is, whether product quality, services, information, or image also
declined.
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Express Dealer Cartel on Single Brand.
A group of dealers may combine to fix their prices, territories, or customers and then
enlist the aid of a manufacturer in enforcing their anticompetitive restraint. Their object,
of course, is excess profit for themselves. Instead, or in addition, a dealer cartel might
seek to protect its members from more efficient dealers. 26 In this scenario, “traditional”
dealers pressure the manufacturer to deny its product to more efficient “new” dealers or
to fix resale prices, which would prevent the latter from attracting patronage with the
lower prices their lower operating costs allow them to charge. 27 So long as a cartel of
traditional dealers accounts for a majority of a manufacturer's sales and has the credible
capacity to abandon the manufacturer, the latter cannot resist the cartel's demands. The
lost business of the cartelized dealers would not be offset by that of the new lowerpriced dealers. Furthermore, where dealers handle multiple brands, a manufacturer who
does not succumb to their demands may find that its product will be removed from their
shelves if rival manufacturers adopt the restraint desired by the dealers.
But we must not exaggerate the danger that traditional dealers could permanently
prevent the entry and growth of more efficient distributors. First, an ultimate sales gain
through the lower prices of new dealers may be attractive to the manufacturer,
notwithstanding the severe intermediate losses the cartel might inflict. Second, if most
manufacturers supply the new dealers without fixing their prices, the cartel cannot
abandon them all, and the new dealers will become more quickly established. Even so,
the several manufacturers may differ in their assessment of the new dealers and in their
aversion to risk, such that none of them dares to take the lead in defying the cartel. 28
And a cartel of multibrand dealers might, after all, threaten manufacturers one at a
time. 29 Third, some manufacturers are likely to supply the new dealers with secondary
or private brands, thus allowing the dealers to become established. In the long run,
therefore, more efficient dealers will probably arise, and manufacturers will come to
prefer them, even if that means losing the traditional dealers. In the meantime, however,
the traditional dealers may be able to impede the growth of the new dealers by pressing
manufacturers to deny them popular brands or to sell to them only in conjunction with
price restraints.
Even when only one brand is involved, a horizontal dealer cartel that fixes prices or

26

This might also be the objective of less organized dealers.

27

If the new dealer's efficiency lies in forgoing services that consumers value less than their cost—
such as luxury surroundings, charge accounts, or free delivery—consumers are unlikely to dispense with
such services so long as the new dealers are forced to charge the same prices as the traditional outlets.
28

See 6 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1425d (3d ed. 2011)

.
29

If most manufacturers succumbed, the resulting industrywide use of distribution restraints should be
a danger signal to the antitrust authorities.
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allocates customers or territories is usually viewed as per se illegal. 30 By contrast,
vertical restrictions on prices, customers or territories are lawful when reasonable. 31 For
this reason the courts typically approve manufacturer-initiated restraints where dealers
merely cooperated with the manufacturer, even if there were some communications
among the dealers that could be characterized as an “agreement.”32
There are two respects in which the market effects of a horizontal cartel among
dealers might not differ from those of a vertical restraint. First, a dealer cartel might
choose the same retail price that the manufacturer imposing a vertical restraint would
choose—for that price would maximize the aggregate dealer-manufacturer profit
available for that brand—and use its collective power solely for the purpose of
bargaining the wholesale price down, thus increasing dealer profits at the expense of
the manufacturer. In that event, the dealers would transfer some excess profit from the
manufacturer to themselves without disturbing output or resource allocation. Offsetting
the bargaining power of another party, however, is not an acceptable justification for a
horizontal cartel. 34 Second, a dealer cartel might have the same procompetitive purpose
as a lawful vertical restriction. For example, suppose that dealers had abandoned
desirable pre-sale demonstrations because those dealers who did not bear the cost of
such demonstrations undersold those who did. Although each dealer individually has an
incentive to behave opportunistically, all might realize that the long-run position of the
brand will be impaired unless they are protected from each other by, say, territorial
allocations. Just as a manufacturer might vertically impose a territorial restriction for this
reason, its dealers might do so horizontally. Given that vertical restrictions are judged by
30

E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-147 (1966) (restraint upon price
competition); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358 (3d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff
dealer claimed boycott orchestrated against it, a price cutter, by other dealers; reversing summary
judgment). Accord Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 380-384 (1966).
31
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
32

See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Manufacturing Co., 61 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
1995) (auto parts manufacturer's termination of distributor in response to complaints from rivals about
plaintiff's superior service did not injure competition; such injury not shown merely by statements from
customers that they had preferred the plaintiff distributor; further, more than 20 dealers of the
manufacturer's product remained in the area, and market as a whole continued robustly competitive);
International Logistics Group., Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1989) (similar); cf.
Eastern Scientific Co. v. Wilde Heerbrugg Instruments, Inc., 572 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir.1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978) (applying rule of reason to an agreement among dealers and supplier that the
supplier would impose resale price maintenance on dealers outside the agreeing dealers' territories);
Purity Products, Inc. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 564 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd mem., 887 F.2d
1081 (4th Cir. 1989) (similar); Culberson, Inc. v. Interstate Electric Co., 821 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1987)
(similar; manufacturer's restraint in place before dealers began corresponding); Beach v. Viking Sewing
Machine Co., 784 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1986) (dealers assisted manufacturer in enforcing its unilaterally
imposed restraints and reported violations; no conspiracy); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington
Industries, Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 614-15 (4th Cir. 1985) (similar); Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 669 F.2d
308, 313 (5th Cir. 1982) (similar).
34

E.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951).
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the rule of reason, and given that the horizontal and vertical restrictions may have the
same object and price-output effect, should not the dealers' agreement also be judged
by the rule of reason?
A restraint imposed by a horizontal dealer cartel should not be treated as hospitably
as a similar vertical restraint. 35First, although a dealer cartel might be sincere in
claiming that its horizontal restraint served an objective that would justify a purely
vertical restraint, the dealers have an incentive to create excess profit for themselves.
By contrast, a manufacturer cannot ordinarily increase its own power through a vertical
restraint, and has every incentive to prevent excess dealer profit beyond that necessary
for effective distribution.
Second, we may reasonably doubt a dealer cartel's claim that intrabrand competition
must be restrained in order to achieve effective distribution. If that were so, the
manufacturer would presumably impose the restraint itself. But if it does not, the cartel
is likely to be either mistaken or insincere in claiming that competition must be restricted
for distribution to be effective. To be sure, a manufacturer might be mistaken, or it might
desire the restraint and yet be so slow to impose it that dealers feel compelled to take
matters into their own hands. But lethargy can be overcome by argumentation, and the
possibility of error seems too insubstantial to allow a cartel—with its incentive to seek
excess profit—to override a manufacturer's preference for intrabrand competition.
Of course, those who oppose per se illegality for a dealer cartel would have us take
these matters into account in applying the rule of reason. The court itself could judge
the validity of the cartel's efficiency justification while taking the manufacturer's position
into account. But even then, finding that the dealer cartel did not restrain competition
more than is necessary would require the court to examine whether output had fallen or
whether prices had risen by more than they would have under a hypothetical vertical
restraint—inquiries that are always difficult and often impossible. Even without making
those inquiries, we might suppose that any harm to competition would be minimal when
trade is restrained in only one of many brands. Nevertheless, dealers are often left
some pricing discretion among differentiated products, and the Supreme Court has not
hesitated to condemn a horizontal customer restraint on a single brand. 36 Automatic
condemnation of the cartel sacrifices only those efficiencies, if any, that a manufacturer
fails to recognize.
Once a dealer cartel is identified as such, it is properly condemned. We need to
reach the accompanying vertical restraint only if it can “camouflage” the horizontal
restraint, making detection more difficult. In examining this question, it seems helpful to
distinguish between (1) the dealer cartel that gets the manufacturer to enforce the
dealers' own horizontal agreement on their prices or markets and (2) the cartel that,
without specifying details, coerces a manufacturer to restrain intrabrand competition
among dealers. If both types can be readily detected, the horizontal cartel can be
largely ignored in framing rules to deal with vertical restraints, although other
35

For a contrary position, see Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand “Cartels” under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA
L. Rev. 1 (1982).
36

United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
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manifestations of dealer power remain to be considered.
In Toledo Mack the Third Circuit condemned a horizontal agreement of Mack Truck
dealers to limit price competition and also collectively to induce their
manufacturer/supplier to impose resale price maintenance on a price cutting dealer. S1
The court found that the per se rule applied to the horizontal portion of the conspiracy
but the rule of reason to the vertical portion:
Because Toledo's evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to
conclude that Mack entered into a competition-restricting
agreement with its dealers, the only remaining question before us
as to that agreement is whether, if proven, it violates §1 of the
Sherman Act. In contrast to horizontal price-fixing agreements
between entities at the same level of a product's distribution chain,
the legality of a vertical agreement that imposes a restriction on the
dealer's ability to sell the manufacturer's product is governed by the
rule of reason. The rule of reason analysis applies even when, as in
this case, the plaintiff alleges that the purpose of the vertical
agreement between a manufacturer and its dealers is to support
illegal horizontal agreements between multiple dealers. S2
The court quoted this language from the Supreme Court's Leegin decision:
“A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing
retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order to
increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful. To the extent a
vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered upon
to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held
unlawful under the rule of reason.”S3
On the rule of reason issue the court concluded that:
Toledo also presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to
conclude that the agreement between Mack and its dealers
produced anti-competitive effects in the relevant product and
geographic markets. Toledo bears the burden of identifying those
markets and showing the anti-competitive effect of the agreement
between Mack and its dealers.…We have explained that proof of
anti-competitive effects “can be achieved by demonstrating that the
restraint is facially anticompetitive or that its enforcement reduced
output, raised prices or reduced quality. Alternatively, because
proof that the concerted action actually caused anticompetitive
effects is often impossible to sustain, proof of the defendant's
S1

Toledo Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 224-225.
S3
Id. at 225, quoting Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007).
S2
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market power will suffice.”
The court said nothing about Mack's market share in any market, concluding merely that
the jury's finding of power was supported.
Notwithstanding the dicta in Leegin, S4 we doubt that the market power finding was
necessary, assuming that the court was correct in its conclusion that the dealer cartel
was a per se unlawful price fixing conspiracy and not simply reporting to the
manufacturer of a free-riding dealer. In that case the manufacturer was fully implicated
in a per se unlawful naked restraint, even though it may have been coerced into doing
so.
Dealers' Agreements on Prices or Markets
In one scenario, the dealers agree among themselves about their prices, customers,
or territories and then force the manufacturer to adopt vertical restraints reflecting the
cartel's terms, to monitor each dealer's compliance (often with the aid of complaints
from other dealers), and to cease supplying those dealers who depart from the
horizontally established terms. Those commentators who deemphasize the dealer
power issue in judging vertical restraints focus mainly on this case, believing that
“detection of reseller cartels is relatively simple.” 37 Their arguments are several.
First, dealers who have fixed prices or have allocated markets among themselves
are unlikely to seek vertical enforcement, for in so doing they would reveal themselves
to a manufacturer who is being harmed and who therefore might not only refuse to
cooperate but might even turn them in to the enforcement authorities. 38 Yet this risk is
far from certain. The manufacturer may abstain from reporting the cartel because the
manufacturer gets something in return for its cooperation, such as preferential treatment
vis-à-vis other manufacturers 39 or because it fears a retaliatory withdrawal of patronage.
And if the manufacturer does comply, it will hesitate to reveal the dealer cartel later,
thereby tainting its vertical restraint and exposing itself to possible treble damage
liability. Still, any incremental monitoring and enforcement that could be obtained from
an unsympathetic manufacturer may not profit the cartel enough to expose itself.
Second, a dealer cartel may be difficult to organize and administer, and it could be
quite visible to the enforcement authorities. 41 Unless dealers are in separate markets,
they might want to agree not only on prices or territories but also on services as well,
lest service competition simply replace price competition. Yet, as the restraint becomes
more nearly complete, the cartel becomes more visible. Still, much the same could be
said of all horizontal price fixing, which occurs nevertheless. Indeed, a dealer cartel
S4

The statement in Leegin was dicta because no horizontal dealer cartel was at issue there.
See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division
II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 409 (1966).
38
Id.
39
See 8 Antitrust Law ¶1610. The manufacturer might also obtain higher profits in the form of a
somewhat higher wholesale price. If a multibrand dealer cartel had the power to raise retail prices, they
might pass some of the profit back to manufacturers in return for their cooperation in enforcing the cartel.
37

41

See Bork, supra, at 408-410.
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designed to coerce the manufacturer seems easier to implement than the usual
horizontal price-fixing cartel, for fewer details need to be agreed upon. The dealers
need not act unanimously in pressuring the manufacturer, 42 and the coerced
manufacturer monitors and enforces the resale prices it then adopts against all dealers,
including “cheating” members of the cartel and nonmembers as well. 43
Third, the scarcity of tangible examples of dealer cartels suggests that the problem
may not be widespread. 44 But such scarcity may reflect the difficulty of detection rather
than rarity. More important, the alleged paucity is limited to the express horizontal
agreement among numerous dealers. That is not our only concern here: Perhaps most
significant, under the per se rule against resale price maintenance that has been in
place for nearly a century, the presence or absence of a dealer cartel is irrelevant to
illegality. As a result, litigation records have not sought to develop whether dealer
collusion was occurring, and most of the studies of resale price maintenance (RPM)
have focused on these records. 45
Less ambitious dealer collaboration is more likely to occur and— even when
express—to avoid detection. An explicit agreement among only a few powerful dealers
that each will individually threaten to abandon the manufacturer's product may impress
the manufacturer with the danger that many more dealers will abandon it if it does not
restrict intrabrand competition. As compared with the first scenario, fewer dealers need
agree, for the manufacturer chooses the resale price; no horizontal agreement will be
brought to the attention of a manufacturer who might turn the dealers in; and
organization and administration need not be so complex as to be obvious to the
enforcement authorities. Such agreements among dealers will not always be detected.
42

By contrast, horizontal price fixing breaks down when some conspirators “cheat” by undercutting
the agreed price.
43
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1826-1937, ch. 25 (1991), detailing a
pharmacists' cartel that induced manufacturers to enforce its prices. That cartel was implicated in the Dr.
Miles decision. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 149 F. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1906)
(upholding RPM agreement); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwaite, 133 F. 794 (C.C.D. Mass. 1904)
(allowing an injunction to restrain interference with resale price maintenance contracts); Park & Sons Co.
v. National Druggists' Ass’n, 175 N.Y. 1 (1903) (upholding RPM agreement that placed no restrictions on
either quantity to be sold or on territory in which it could be sold). The existence of the cartel was
established in Loder v. Jayne, 142 F. 1010 (C.C.E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906). Other state
court decisions condemned boycotts that resulted from the cartel. Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme,
104 Md. 218 (1906); Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429 (1902).
44

Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 23-24 (1981). Judge Posner's more recent position seems more
sympathetic to the view that dealers' cartels are sufficiently troublesome to warrant scrutiny and
condemnation. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 172 (2d ed. 2001).
45

E.g., Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical
Evidence (FTC Bureau of Economics 1983); Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical
Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. & Econ. 263 (1991). See also David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls
with Uncertain Demand, 40 J.L. & Econ. 433 (1997) (finding dealer cartels a common explanation in
certain markets characterized by low production costs, high retailer markups, but highly uncertain
demand).
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Still more difficult to detect or prohibit is dealer pressure that is not embodied in any
horizontal agreement.
Interdependence and Informal Action
No express agreement among the dealers need be postulated at all. Perhaps at
lawful trade association meetings for the industry or for a particular brand, dealers
express to each other a common preference for restricted distribution or opposition to
discounters or new types of dealers. Each may independently express that view to the
manufacturer—perhaps simply in a public forum. 46 Well short of any understanding
among the dealers, the manufacturer could feel the pressure. There is much less to
detect or report here than in the cartel situation, and, if reported, there is no clear
agreement among the dealers. Even if the dealers were acting interdependently, mere
interdependent behavior does not establish a conspiracy. Indeed, many situations in
which partial or informal coordination would not constitute a “conspiracy” within the
meaning of Sherman Act §1. It would be a serious misjudgment to overlook the many
forms of “quasi-collective” pressure that can be exerted by dealer organizations.
Powerful individual dealers
A manufacturer might be forced to restrain distribution in order to appease one or
more individually powerful dealers. To be sure, dealer power might seem rare in view of
the large numbers of wholesale and retail dealers and the relatively easy entry into
distribution(unless government licenses are both required and scarce). Distribution
seems generally competitive, at least in the absence of the express, fairly obvious, and
illegal cartel.
Nevertheless, dealer power might exist for some products, at some times, and in
some places. 49 In selected geographic markets, demand may be insufficient to support
a large number of dealers. Even within large metropolitan areas, effective distribution
may involve few outlets, either because unusual talents are needed or because efficient
scale is large relative to demand. Furthermore, the success, situation, or special talent
of some dealers will give them power over particular suppliers. Multibrand dealers,
especially those who also handle other types of products, are relatively more powerful
than less diversified dealers. Chain or other stores may have power due to their high
concentration in some areas. Finally, present dealers may enjoy some degree of power
simply because the manufacturer would bear significant transaction costs in shifting to
46

For example, in Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit de Corp., 769 F.2d 919 (2d
Cir. 1985), an official of a large department store chain gave a public speech indicating that suppliers of
discount retailers risked losing department store patronage. Id. at 921-922. The court declined to infer any
conspiracy between the department store and a manufacturer who refused to fill the orders of the plaintiff
discounter (but who did supply other discounters). The court understood Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), to prevent the inference of a conspiracy merely from reaction to a
direct complaint to a manufacturer. 769 F.2d at 923.
49

See generally Michael E. Porter, Interbrand Choice, Strategy, and Bilateral Market Power, ch. 2
(1976); Richard E. Caves, Economic Models of Vertical Restraints: Market Failure and Market Power
(Harvard Institute for Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 754, 1980); Overstreet, supra, at 16 n.2.
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new dealers.
Indeed, several claimed justifications for distribution restraints that will be discussed
later seem to assume that dealers have power to extract extra profit. The dealer whose
status allows it to “certify” that the products it handles are fashionable or of high quality
may have such power. The dealer whose professed brand preferences are valued by
consumers also has that capacity.
Moreover, any dealer who seeks a distribution restraint may be typical of a class of
dealers whom the manufacturer values highly. Even without express or tacit
coordination among such dealers, the manufacturer may well understand that the
consequences of not bowing to one dealer's expressed desire may be far-reaching. This
situation blends into the next, which requires neither a cartel nor individually powerful
dealers.
A manufacturer's choice might be constrained by the realization that multibrand
dealers, though numerous and individually without market power, might cease to stock
any one brand that is subject to intense intrabrand competition.
Imagine that a new and more efficient dealer lowers its price on brand A. Because
the reduction results from greater efficiency and not from free riding, the manufacturer
of A should be pleased. However, other more “traditional” dealers will be displeased and
may abandon brand A, display it poorly, or make it available only to customers who will
buy no other brand. Whether they actually do so or only threaten to do so, the
manufacturer can foresee the danger. Accordingly, it may either refuse to supply the
price-cutting dealer or restrict its competitive freedom. Such restricted distribution
results neither from the manufacturer's unconstrained preference nor from the obvious
power of a dealer cartel or of a locally dominant dealer; it results rather from a more
subtle form of coercion by numerous nondominant dealers acting individually. But we
cannot predict how often such a manufacturer would be driven in this direction.
Given its preference for the lowest possible dealer profit margin consistent with
efficient distribution and given the assumed absence of free riding or similar conditions,
the disaffection of the traditional dealers would not trouble such a manufacturer when
the “efficient” dealers are sufficiently established and numerous to maintain sales
volume. But until their volume offsets that likely to be lost as traditional dealers
downgrade or abandon the brand, the manufacturer needs the traditional dealers. Their
hold over the manufacturer may be merely transitional, but the intervening losses may
be very serious to a manufacturer whose profit margins are modest.
Dealer power can be particularly onerous to the manufacturer who does not enjoy
pronounced consumer loyalty and who therefore depends upon dealers' willingness to
stock its brand. Multibrand dealers' ability to substitute other brands gives the dealers
considerable leverage. This might explain why so many of the products that have been
subject to resale price maintenance, both here and abroad, have not exhibited the freerider or difficult entry characteristics that might suggest a manufacturer's need for
restricted distribution.
Even manufacturers with well-recognized brand names can be the victims of such
dealer power, as the Pepsodent episode illustrates. In the 1930s, Pepsodent was a
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well-known brand of toothpaste, nationally promoted on one of the most popular radio
comedies of the day. Nevertheless, when the manufacturer abandoned resale price
maintenance, the National Association of Retail Druggists urged its members to remove
Pepsodent from public display and to attempt to switch customers to other brands. The
manufacturer felt the heat and surrendered, not only reinstituting vertical price fixing but
making a contribution to the association's lobbying fund. 52 While the druggists were
obviously powerful when acting as a cartelized unit, the results could have been
identical without any organization or recommendation. An individual druggist unhappy
with Pepsodent's efforts toward competition could put that toothpaste behind the
counter and bring it out only for those few consumers who would refuse to accept other
brands. This step would not only be personally satisfying for the druggist, it would also
sacrifice no significant sales even if other druggists did not do the same. With many
individual dealers acting similarly, Pepsodent would feel the pressure even though the
dealers individually lacked dominant positions and had organized no cartel.
It may seem curious to speak of dealer power in a competitively structured retail
market. No such power would be inferred when dealers generally shun a particular
manufacturer with a “too high” wholesale price and thereby “force” the manufacturer to
lower its price. That case illustrates a “competitive market,” not dealer “power.” By
contrast, however, the dealers' ability to force an unwilling manufacturer to insulate
them from competition among themselves is surely not an instance of competition at
work. In the Pepsodent illustration, the druggists' ability to force a suppression of
competition may fairly be described as “dealer power” bringing about a departure from
competitive behavior.
It may also seem curious to suppose that retail prices can be forced above
competitive levels when no one dealer possesses any power over price or over the
manufacturer. Leaving aside express conspiracies among the dealers and even loosely
coordinated quasicollective action, several kinds of market failure may be present.
Economies of scale in distribution make the manufacturer dependent upon multibrand,
multiproduct dealers, such as drug stores. And druggists willing to sell Pepsodent for
less may find the cost of advertising that fact unduly expensive relative to the
incremental sales likely to be won, especially when consumers will not travel very far to
get a bargain on a single, relatively inexpensive product like toothpaste. Ultimately,
discount stores may arise and sell a full range of drugstore products at lower prices that
can be effectively advertised and to which consumers will make a special journey to
purchase toothpaste along with other products.
Dealers have the greatest leverage over a manufacturer when they handle multiple
brands, when consumers do not insist upon a particular brand, and when the dealers
have reason to punish only one or a few manufacturers by stocking and featuring the
brands of other manufacturers that do restrict distribution as the dealers prefer.
Convenience goods enjoying modest brand preferences are good illustrations. Of
course, if all manufacturers simultaneously reject new restrictions or abandon old ones,
the dealers cannot punish them all. But such procompetitive unanimity does not often
52

Thomas R. Overstreet, Jr., Resale Price Maintenance: Economic Theories and Empirical Evidence
145-146 n.2 (FTC Bureau of Economics 1983), quoting an earlier FTC report.

Hovenkamp

Intrabrand Restraints and Dealer Power

Nov., 2010, Page 15

occur. If termination of a price cutter is at issue, the several manufacturers may
estimate their ultimate prospects differently or feel differing degrees of insecurity. Or
one manufacturer may adopt distribution restraints in the first instance in order to
encourage dealers to try to shift consumers to its brand. Once the manufacturer's rivals
follow, none gain any advantage from the restraints, but the first to abandon them may
be punished by the dealers, such that none can afford to lead the manufacturers away
from a system of restraints that no longer serves their interests. 53 Similarly, a restraint
may arise to encourage dealer services during the early “life cycle” of a new product but
then may be continued later into the cycle, 54 when that particular restraint has become
unnecessary and inefficient, because no one manufacturer acting alone can risk taking
the lead to abandon the practice. This may indeed be the explanation for the
continuation of some restraints beyond the time when they might have made distribution
more effective. 55

Detection and Significance of Dealer Power
A provable agreement among dealers to seek or abide by resale price
maintenance—whether or not it specifies the resale price—is unlawful regardless of the
dealers' market power. The accompanying vertical agreements should also be
considered unlawful, even though they might possibly have an independent justification
and may be enjoined temporarily but not permanently. Nevertheless, to condemn only
detectable horizontal dealer agreements would immunize many vertical restraints
reflecting anticompetitive dealer interests. A dealer cartel might achieve its objective
without revealing itself, such as when a dealer association organized for other purposes
exerts subtle collective pressure on one or more manufacturers. Or key dealers might
individually threaten or “persuade” a manufacturer that effective distribution requires an
intrabrand restriction. Even an informal or loosely organized group can bring pressure
on the manufacturer to eliminate intrabrand competition. Apart from the express dealer
cartel, antitrust law's horizontal restraint rules do not adequately control the vertical
restraint that implements dealers' desire for restricted competition for its own sake.
Accordingly, we need to examine whether and how we can identify the restraint that is
ostensibly vertical but that actually serves anticompetitive dealer interests.
“Horizontal” Characterization of Vertical Restraint
When dealer interests rather than manufacturer interests appear to be served, many

53

Of course, the first to abandon the restraint might gain a competitive advantage if discounting
dealers were sufficiently numerous and substantial.
54

The “lifecycle” explanation of vertical restraints is pursued by Robert L. Steiner, Vertical Restraints
and Economic Efficiency (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 66, 1982).
55

See the study of audio components summarized by Overstreet, supra, at 123-124, who also mentions
“mistakes, inertia and risk aversion” as possible explanations.
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courts describe a vertical restraint as “horizontal,”56 even in the absence of collective
action by dealers. 57 Such a classification is meant to express a finding that the restraint
before the court serves a dealer's desire for excess profits rather than a possible
manufacturer's desire for more efficient distribution through, for example, point-of-sale
services. Once classified as horizontal, the restraint may then be said to be per se
unlawful. 58 That per se characterization is meant to express three propositions. (1) A
restraint serving dealer interests opposed to those of the manufacturer is unjustified. (2)
Hence, finding that a restraint is explained solely by dealer power excludes the
possibility of justification and thus obviates any further inquiry into that subject. (3) Such
a restraint is so inherently likely to have anticompetitive effects that it should be
condemned without regard to market share or other proof of effects. In other words,
there is little reason to undertake complex inquiries into power or effect merely because
the restraint might have failed to achieve its anticompetitive object of bringing dealers
excess profit. Each of these propositions may be persuasive, but using “horizontal” and
“per se” labels is objectionable on several grounds. First, the horizontal label, as the
Supreme Court observed, “introduces needless confusion into antitrust
terminology.” 60Second, the labels do not reveal what the court is doing as clearly as
propositions like the three stated above. Third, stating explicitly one's factual and legal
propositions exposes the important issues buried beneath the labels. 61
For example, if the proper legal rule is captured by proposition 2, the tribunal knows
that it cannot dispense with further analysis until it rejects any legitimate justifications
claimed—that is, until it focuses on the strength or weakness of the indicators of dealer
power and concludes that dealer power alone explains the restraint. Moreover, the
horizontal label perniciously invites the tribunal to forgo analyzing the policies underlying
the three propositions (or whatever should be substituted for them), disposing of the
case merely by citing precedents condemning genuine horizontal conspiracies between

56

See, e.g., Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979). Cf. O'Dell v.
General Motors, 122 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (agreement under which GM terminated parts
distribution contracts with Delco dealers to be treated as vertical, because there was no proven agreement
among the remaining dealers).
57

E.g., Alloy International Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1225-1226 (7th Cir.
1980).
58

E.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 736, 744 (1988)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Cernuto, 595 F.2d 164.
60

Business Electronics, 485 U.S. at 728-729 (majority opinion).

61

Particularly noteworthy is the failure of many such courts to identify the parties to or the subject
matter of the “contract, combination, or conspiracy” required by Sherman Act §1. The Fifth Circuit
pointed this out in criticizing the Cernuto case, Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d
Cir. 1979). Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1216-1218 (5th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 717.
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competitors. 62 Nevertheless, the shorthand “vertical” or “truly vertical” may be used with
caution to describe restraints serving the manufacturer's interest in efficient distribution.
Unfortunately, it is hard to know whose interests a vertical restraint serves without
examining market and behavioral factors.
Identifying vertical restraints compelled by a powerful dealer or dealer cartel would
be pointless if condemnation merely channeled such dealer pressure into lawful
alternatives that were equally anticompetitive. But prohibiting such restraints would not
be futile. Alternative cartel activities will be closely monitored, if not forbidden, by the
law. Although a powerful individual dealer might instead bargain for lower wholesale
prices or for an exclusive territory, the former is not ordinarily anticompetitive, 63 and the
latter will often be impractical for the manufacturer. Of course, a dealer might simply
drop a brand in which price competition had erupted, and a manufacturer fearing this
might keep its product out of the hands of price cutters. Still, forbidding distribution
restraints motivated by dealer power usefully obstructs the process of restraining
competition to appease dealers.
Dealer power is not likely to be the explanation for a vertical restraint if dealers in
that brand cannot profit from elevating price above the competitive level, cannot obtain
the vertical restraint from an unwilling manufacturer—or have not in fact done so—or if
the restraint is no more intensive than necessary to achieve a legitimate manufacturer
interest that cannot otherwise be adequately achieved. Hence, to assess the likelihood
that a vertical restraint serves dealer interests, we must explore three areas. (1) We
need to identify the circumstances in which a hypothetical “monopolist” dealer in one
brand could gain excess profit through a vertical restraint.(2) If that hypothetical dealer
could do so, dealers in that brand would have the anticompetitive incentive to obtain a
vertical intrabrand restraint. Thus, we need to identify the circumstances in which
dealers could extract such a restraint from an unwilling manufacturer. Because the
answers to these first two questions are often ambiguous, we will often be forced to look
for other observable indicia in the parties' actual behavior or performance suggesting
that a vertical restraint reflects dealer power. (3) If these inquiries suggest a significant
danger that dealer power is present, we need to determine whether a legitimate
manufacturer interest explains the restraint instead.
Detecting Dealer Power: Interbrand Retail Market Structure
Dealers cannot win excess profit through a distribution restraint unless a manufacturer
who is conscripted to serve them has sufficient market power to make a restriction of

62

The Business Electronics dissent, 485 U.S. at 742-744 (Stevens, J., dissenting), did rely on such
precedents. Although it also advanced other reasons for its conclusion, it may have been too quick to read
a jury verdict as finding dealer power.
63
Perhaps a powerful dealer could obtain a discriminatory discount, using the resulting cost advantage
to destroy his retailing rivals. Discriminatory preferences for one dealer are controlled to some extent by
the Robinson-Patman Act.
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output feasible and profitable. 64 Interbrand competition at the retail level obviously limits
(1) the ability of dealers to profit from an intrabrand restraint and, consequently, also
limits both(2) their incentive to use any power they may have over a manufacturer to
obtain a restraint, and (3) the adverse public results of any such restraint.
Dealers have the incentive to limit competition among themselves via a vertical
restraint (if they can obtain one from a reluctant manufacturer) when interbrand
competition is weak because (1) the vertically price-fixed brand is dominant or otherwise
enjoys market power, (2) dealers in all brands are concentrated, or (3) most brands are
subject to similar vertical restraints. Of course, these factors do not necessarily indicate
an unreasonable restraint. A brand may be locally dominant and yet need distribution
restraints for legitimate purposes. Dealers may be concentrated and yet be unable to
act anticompetitively. Or a distribution restraint might be so essential to solve common
business problems that all manufacturers of a product feel compelled to use it. Still,
there is a significant danger that restraints covering important brands, or all of them in a
concentrated market, serve dealer power.
We will seldom be able to observe the strength of interbrand competition directly or
to know whether a vertical restraint serves dealers rather than manufacturers. Most
often, the best we can do is to examine the market or behavioral evidence to see
whether dealer power is a danger. There are several indicators, some suggesting a
greater danger than others. Arbitrary lines will be drawn based, for example, on market
shares. Obviously, the justification for drawing an arbitrary line at one place rather than
another depends upon the consequences. If defendants falling on the adverse side of
the line are to be punished heavily, the line should be “higher” than if such defendants
are merely to be required to offer some evidence of justification without bearing the
burden of persuasion on that issue. Of course, the consequences could also be
somewhere in between. It is too early to specify the possible legal consequences, which
depend both upon one's assessment of the possible justifications and upon precedents
dealing with particular distribution restraints. At the very least, factors indicating a
significant danger of anticompetitive effects warrant requiring a restraint's defenders to
offer evidence of a plausible and legitimate business purpose reasonably served by a
challenged restraint.
The ability of dealers to profit from a vertical restraint on one brand and thereby to
prejudice consumers is clearest when that brand dominates the market. 65 As usual,
defining the market is the preliminary step. 66 The product class, rather than a particular
brand, forms the product market. 67 The geographic dimension is often obscure. In
asking whether dealers can profit from a distribution restraint, we must examine their
power vis-à-vis consumers, who often confine their purchases to nearby suppliers—
because transport costs are significant relative to the value of the product, because they
64

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6, 16-18 (1981); Robert H. Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn
Overruled, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 171, 190-191.
65
In such a case the manufacturer may be too powerful to be coerced by dealers. But we focus here on
the incentive for dealers to extract a vertical restraint from a manufacturer.
66
See 2B Antitrust Law, Ch. 5 (3d ed. 2007)..
67
On the general inappropriateness of single-brand markets, see id.,
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wish to deal face-to-face, because they need pre- or post-sale service, or simply
because of conventional shopping habits. Hence, the relevant geographic market within
which consumers can find alternative suppliers will often be local. The true boundaries
of the market are not easily defined, for coordinated interbrand prices within a major
shopping mall may benefit the dealers, notwithstanding more modest concentration
levels in the city as a whole. Moreover, buyers obviously cannot turn to dealers who are
restrained from selling to them; thus, the market must exclude dealers who, although
within a reasonable distance from the customers, are prevented by distribution
restraints from supplying them. Thus, the relevant market is limited not only by the usual
cost-distance standards but also by any distribution restraints that prevent other dealers
from supplying any significant grouping of buyers. 68
Although any market-share test for dominance is arbitrary, 50 percent is a
reasonable measure. To require dominance in this sense, however, may demand too
much. Significant market power can exist without dominance. The mere existence of a
distribution restraint ordinarily implies significant product differentiation. While the resale
prices of homogeneous products, like sugar, have sometimes been fixed vertically, 69 the
usual distribution restraint involves differentiated products that consumers do not regard
as perfect substitutes. There is thus some degree of pricing discretion that can be
exploited by a manufacturer or its dealers.
Dealer Concentration
Even if a restrained brand does not itself enjoy market power, its dealers within a
retail market can profit from a vertical restraint if other brands or dealers are few enough
to achieve noncompetitive prices through explicit or tacit coordination. If the retail
market is concentrated, supracompetitive prices by dealers insulated from intrabrand
competition by a vertical restraint might not be constrained by rival-brand dealers who
choose to coordinate their prices tacitly with the restrained dealers.
To assess concentration, we turn again to the relevant retail market. Although many
factors impede or facilitate the ability of firms to coordinate their behavior
anticompetitively, market structure is a customary index of relative degrees of risk. We
regard an HHI exceeding 1200 as an indication of potentially troublesome
concentration. 72 Note, moreover, that if concentration is high enough to permit the
vertically restrained dealers to coordinate their prices with other dealers in the local
market, those other dealers need not themselves be vertically restrained.
Cumulative Market Coverage
When used by all manufacturers, distribution restraints could severely narrow
68

For the same reason, we should normally exclude firms that might be able to adapt themselves to
distributing the product, for they cannot obtain the products unless manufacturers are willing to supply
them.
69

Vertical restraints on homogeneous products lack most of the justifications considered later and are
therefore very likely to be horizontally motivated and anticompetitive.
72

See 4 Antitrust Law ¶930 (3d ed. 2008) for a definition and discussion of the HHI.

Hovenkamp

Intrabrand Restraints and Dealer Power

Nov., 2010, Page 20

interbrand competition at the dealer level and thereby increase the restraint's
attractiveness to the dealers and magnify any adverse welfare consequences the
restraint might have. On the other hand, widespread use might merely reflect a common
business problem, which all manufacturers faced and solved with a similar vertical
restraint. Nevertheless, widespread coverage indicates a significant likelihood that the
restraint serves anticompetitive dealer interests, and even those who are sympathetic to
vertical distribution restraints acknowledge that this danger increases with market
coverage.
Observe that modest market coverage does not guarantee that manufacturer
interests are being served, although it both increases the likelihood that they are 74 and
minimizes the adverse public consequences when dealer interests are served. Even
without wide market coverage, however, we have already seen that a brand may enjoy
market power; in addition, dealers in one brand may be able to profit if the retail market
is concentrated.
Economic Performance
Evidence that costs 75 and price-cost margins were at competitive levels would
indicate that the brand lacked market power and that anticompetitive dealer interests
were not being served by a distribution restraint. At the other extreme, persistent
excesses over competitive levels for the manufacturer would indicate brand power, and
such excesses for dealers generally would indicate that a vertical restraint serves their
anticompetitive interests; this would be true even if other brands were also generating
supracompetitive profits. But reliable data about “competitive levels” or dealer margins
are often unavailable. In addition to the usual difficulties of gathering and assessing
evidence about price-cost margins, it is not practicable to collect profit data from many
dealers, whose profits will vary; and accounting records do not reveal true economic
profits by brand in situations where (1) dealers handle several products or brands, (2)
compensation for the dealer's own (and perhaps family) labor is a residual, or (3) an
excess return is obscured by excess costs. The administrative burden of relying on
dealer profits seems disproportionate to the social stake in preventing or allowing
restricted distribution. It also seems unfair to impose liability on parties who could hardly
know in advance what such a profit survey would show. The legal rules governing
intrabrand restraints should be devised without relying, one way or the other, on
analysis of dealer profits.
A vertical restraint cannot completely insulate dealers from intrabrand competition
74

See, e.g., Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distributors, Inc., 637 F.2d 1376, 1387 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
75

Costs may not be at competitive levels if dealer-inspired vertical restraints divert rivalry into service
or other forms of nonprice competition, which raise costs and thereby erode profit, while nonetheless
distorting the price-service mix desired by manufacturer and consumers. Accordingly, the absence of
excess dealer profits would not disprove dealer power, for dealers might prefer the quiet life of nonprice
competition even if they failed to secure excess profits.
.
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when services or other nonprice rivalries are important. On that account some writers
hesitate to infer that dealer power accounts for a vertical restraint unless such nonprice
competition is also restrained. 77 But that hesitation rests on the faulty premise that firms
do not seek to eliminate competition on, say, price unless they can also eliminate all
other competition as well. After all, horizontal cartels often fix prices without limiting
services, and dealer-inspired resale price maintenance often occurs in the face of
service competition. Of course, the presence of substantial dealer services of the kind
desired by manufacturers may mean that enhanced service competition is the legitimate
object of the restraint.
To the extent that an inference of dealer power is based on market concentration,
might that inference be rebutted by showing that other market circumstances impede
tacit price coordination among dealers? The general answer would be negative for the
reasons given elsewhere, although a strong policy preference in favor of distribution
restraints, or some of them, would call for greater hospitality toward that inquiry.
Permanent excess profits are also prevented by easy entry at the manufacturing or
distribution level. With easy entry at the former level, dealers in existing brands will not
be able to elevate the price above competitive levels—at least not for long. And with
easy entry at the distribution level, incumbent dealers will not be able to maintain high
prices against the manufacturer's will. If dealers cannot earn excess profits, they
presumably will not try—at least not successfully—to obtain a distribution restraint for
that purpose. Accordingly, a distribution restraint in retail markets in which entry
requires a scarce governmental license —as liquor sales often do—would be especially
dangerous. But this does not mean that proof of substantial entry barriers is a
prerequisite to worrying about dealer power or that proof of low entry barriers should
rebut a presumption or inference of dealer power.
Modest entry barriers reduce but do not eliminate the dealer power problem. New
entry at the manufacturing level may erode an existing brand's power only slowly and
may be irrelevant if dealers are concentrated or if multibrand dealers find widespread
resale price maintenance attractive and hesitate to handle a new product that is not
vertically restrained. Although entry at the dealer level is generally thought to be
relatively easy, it may not be attractive in some thin local markets. More important,
manufacturers may suffer substantial transaction costs in replacing existing dealers,
may be unable to replace enough of them simultaneously to abandon a system of
vertical restraints, 80 and may be constrained by state statutes from altering existing
dealerships.
Apart from their significance in principle, entry barriers are hard to quantify, and
there is no way to relate any general assessment— low, moderate, or high barriers—to
the magnitude or duration of price-raising power held by market incumbents. As a
77

E.g., Stanley I. Ornstein, Resale Price Maintenance and Cartels, 30 Antitrust Bull. 401, 407, 413,
431-432 (1985).
80

If a manufacturer can be coerced into restraining resale prices, that restraint would presumably
apply to new dealers as well, until they are sufficiently numerous to allow the manufacturer to abandon
not only the restraint but also, if necessary, those dealers who demand the restraint.
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practical matter, therefore, we doubt that entry barriers are worth assessing in order to
judge distribution restraints, except in those rare cases where the barriers are clearly so
low as to be nonexistent.
Dealers cannot force an unwilling manufacturer to restrict intrabrand competition to
their advantage unless they possess some power over it. 81 Of course, there is no better
demonstration of power than its exercise. Suppose, for example, that a manufacturer
explicitly declared that distribution restraints would be inefficient but nevertheless
adopted them after dealers threatened, “Restrain intrabrand competition or we cease
handling your product.” The resulting restraint could then be readily attributed to dealer
power and fairly judged unreasonable. Few actual cases will be so clear.
That dealers may possess substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis manufacturers may
seem surprising. Not only are dealers typically smaller than manufacturers, but the
tremendous number and variety of retailers nationally implies atomistic competition. But
there may be relatively few of them in the local area within which a relevant group of
consumers shop. Moreover, a dealer's bargaining power varies not with its size relative
to the manufacturer but with the manufacturer's cost of switching dealers or integrating
forward; as that cost is greater, so is the dealer's bargaining power. Even where dealers
are fungible and plentiful, the cost of finding and training new dealers and the delay
before they become fully effective may be substantial. Where a local market is served
by a small number of well-entrenched dealers, finding an effective substitute or
integrating forward may burden a manufacturer even more.
Thus, when one or a few powerful dealers—either single- or multibrand—request
protection from intrabrand competition, they need not be “more powerful” than the
manufacturer in any absolute sense. It suffices that they, and perhaps others who share
their sentiments, have the will and ability to inflict greater harm on the manufacturer
than its loss from limiting intrabrand competition. When that limitation applies only to a
few local markets or when it takes the form of modest spatial or temporal separation of
other dealers from the powerful dealer(s), the manufacturer's loss may be relatively
insignificant. For example, a downtown department store may be satisfied when the
manufacturer, at little loss to itself, supplies only those discounters located in the
suburbs or delays supplying discounters with newer models or fashions. In addition,
those dealers capable of “certifying” a product's quality or fashion need not account for
a large share of a manufacturer's local sales.
Even when dealers are not individually powerful, they may respond so predictably to
a manufacturer's rejection or termination of distribution restraints that the manufacturer
must view them as a collectivity, which probably has sufficient power to warrant
concern. This is most likely to occur on products distributed through multibrand dealers,
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Of course, a manufacturer might willingly restrain intrabrand competition in order to allow dealers
to secure and retain (rather than compete away) excess profit in order to obtain something he wants, such
as exclusive dealing to the detriment of other manufacturers, misleading dealer recommendations to
consumers, or faithful performance of dealership obligations.
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who can readily shift their patronage or “selling enthusiasm” among brands. 83 If many
manufacturers limit intrabrand competition—when multibrand dealers are involved the
most common restriction is resale price maintenance—others may feel compelled to
follow them, and none may be able individually to afford to abandon the restraint. If only
one or very few manufacturers employ the restriction, dealer power is unlikely to be the
reason, unless those manufacturers are relatively weak, as a modest market share
might indicate.
We are not confident that we can tell when resale price maintenance is a response
to dealer power, although a relatively weak indicator would be a dealer's market share—
say, 30 percent of a manufacturer's local or total sales—local when the manufacturer
restrains competition on its brand in only a few local markets and broader when it
practices the restraint more generally.
Dealer Initiatives: Possible Congruence With Manufacturer Interest
Obviously, the absence of dealer initiatives does not disprove dealer power, for
unreasonable restraints may be adopted without any visible threats or demands. Dealer
pressure may manifest itself in ways subtle as well as ways overt, and changing
economic circumstances—such as an increase in dealer power—may render a oncereasonable restraint unreasonable without a word being said.
Nor does the presence of a dealer initiative guarantee that the restraint is
illegitimate. A manufacturer does not necessarily bow to dealer power when the
manufacturer adopts or enforces a distribution restraint individually or collectively
requested by dealers. 85 It is difficult to tell when the restraint is a masquerade for dealer
power, 86 precisely because the manufacturer's interest may be congruent with that of
the dealers. For example, when the product requires costly pre-sale demonstrations,
which some dealers forgo while using the costs thus saved to undercut the retail prices
of demonstrating dealers, both the latter dealers and the manufacturer have a common
incentive to moderate the “free ride” of the nondemonstrating dealers. When the
manufacturer does so on its own initiative, the intrabrand restriction looks “truly vertical.”
It may be no less so when the manufacturer imposes restrictions after complaints,
arguments, or persuasion—“We can't continue demonstrating or handling if this goes
83

Single-brand dealers who can easily shift to other brands could have the same kind of power,
although we may doubt that other brands could quickly absorb the bulk of a particular manufacturer's
dealers who became disappointed because the manufacturer dropped or refused to adopt distribution
restraints.
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Dealer initiatives bear on distribution restraints in two ways. First, a dealer initiative might indicate
that a restraint serves dealer power rather than a legitimate manufacturer interest, which is the subject of
the present discussion. Second, action by a manufacturer in response to dealer initiative might be the only
evidence of the “contract, combination, or conspiracy” necessary to trigger Sherman Act §1. Though
related, the two inquiries are separate: an initiative might suffice to show dealer power without implying
any agreement by the manufacturer with anyone.
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The Sylvania Court acknowledged “occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from
horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers.” Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977).
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on”—from one dealer, many dealers individually, or even a dealer trade association.
Even when dealer action can fairly be characterized as a “demand,” the manufacturer's
acquiescence does not necessarily mean that any resulting restraint is unreasonable.
The dealer may simply be unable to survive or to continue to offer good service without
some protection from intrabrand competition. 87 And even if the dealer's survival is not in
danger, it may have more profitable alternatives, which may or may not promise
monopoly profits.
The Supreme Court recognized this ambiguity in its Monsanto decision. 89 The Court
held that a conspiracy between a dealer and the manufacturer may not be inferred from
the latter's termination of a rival price-cutting dealer after the former's complaint. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court expressed a policy judgment favoring the movement
of information from dealers to manufacturers:
Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the
existence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination
came about “in response to” complaints, could deter or penalize
perfectly legitimate conduct. As Monsanto points out, complaints
about price-cutters “are natural—and from the manufacturer's
perspective, unavoidable— reactions by distributors to the activities
of their rivals.” Such complaints, particularly where the
manufacturer has imposed a costly set of nonprice restrictions,
“arise in the normal course of business and do not indicate illegal
concerted action.” Moreover, distributors are an important source of
information for manufacturers. … To bar a manufacturer from
acting solely because the information upon which it acts originated
as a price complaint would create an irrational dislocation in the
market. 90
Furthermore, we must take care not to penalize the manufacturer who initially
chooses intrabrand competition and turns to restraints only after dealer representations
about, say, substantial free riding. It is for this reason that many courts have insisted
that no adverse inferences should be drawn from dealer initiatives in the absence of
proof that dealers induced the manufacturer to act contrary to its own best interests. 91
Nevertheless, we need to consider whether weak inferences may properly be based on
some dealer initiatives.
Dealer power is easy to recognize and should be decisive in the rare case in which a
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If the manufacturer reluctantly accedes, has it been “coerced” by dealer power or by reasonable
market necessity?
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Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-764 (1984). See also Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-727 (1988).
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Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-764.
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E.g., Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 639
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
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manufacturer rejects a dealer association's request for intrabrand restraints until it
threatens the manufacturer with a collective withdrawal of its members' patronage.
Although any organized dealer activity might be viewed with suspicion, 93 dealers are
allowed to form trade associations, to develop and exchange certain kinds of
information, and to promote common interests in a single brand or in a class of goods.
Their joint complaints or requests might merely evidence the obvious fact that they
cannot continue to advertise, promote, and demonstrate the product when many
nondemonstrating dealers undercut their prices. But perhaps we should distinguish
enforcement of ongoing restraints from their original creation.
Collective monitoring and reports of dealer compliance with existing intrabrand
restraints apparently imposed voluntarily by the manufacturer do not indicate any dealer
interests opposed to those of the manufacturer. Once a system of restraints is in place,
it is in the interests of all complying dealers to detect and report violations to the
manufacturer. Accordingly, we should not infer dealer power from subsequent
enforcement by the manufacturer of its vertical restrictions, 94 although joint complaints
might imply a threat of collective reprisal. The tribunal would, of course, be reassured if
the defendant came forward with evidence of legitimate purposes.
More suspicious—and therefore perhaps warranting imposition on the defenders of
the burden of persuasion as to justification—is the restraint that was first adopted or
significantly intensified after collective dealer requests. Although the manufacturer's
failure to restrain distribution before receiving concerted instruction from dealers is, as
we have seen, not decisive, the danger that a dealer conspiracy has coerced the
manufacturer is severe in such cases.
To be sure, even dealers acting collectively would have difficulty coercing an
unwilling manufacturer if they account for a trivial portion of its sales in a local market or
can be readily replaced without delay, disruption, or other transaction costs.
Accordingly, should the law withhold its concern about dealers acting collectively unless
they account for a substantial share of the manufacturer's local sales or cannot be
readily replaced? A simpler approach could merely acknowledge that an inference of
dealer power based on collective requests is relatively weak and allow it to be overcome
when the defenders offer some evidence of a legitimate manufacturer purpose, perhaps
bearing the burden of persuasion as well in cases of initial adoption (or intensification)
after collective action.
93

All joint action by a dealers' association with an actual or potential detrimental effect on competition
constitutes a “contract … in restraint of trade,” which can be appraised for reasonableness. If antitrust
courts believe that such an association's representations to manufacturers about distribution restraints
create an undue risk of coercing an unwilling manufacturer, they should deem these joint activities
unreasonable.
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The restraint in such a situation was held to constitute an illegal horizontal restraint in United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). We may doubt that Chevrolet dealers, even organized
Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area, compelled that powerful manufacturer to adopt and enforce
customer restraints. However, the Court focused exclusively on the concerted activities of the dealers
without relating them to the manufacturer's independent interest in the vertical restraints it had created
without input from the Los Angeles dealers.
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A “dominant” dealer's request for adoption or enforcement of a restraint might coerce
a manufacturer in the same way as a collective request. Dominance for this purpose
would be indicated by, say, 30 percent of a manufacturer's local or total sales of the
product in question—local when the manufacturer employs the restraint only in an
occasional local market and broader when the manufacturer employs it generally. Still,
individual initiatives indicate coercive power only weakly, and dealers should have
greater latitude to speak individually than collectively.
Form of Restraint
The scope of a manufacturer's restraint might suggest its function. If it is used in only
a few regions, a restraint probably does not address any pervasive free-rider problem or
other market failure and may instead respond to the power of dealers in those areas.
On the other hand, dealer power might not explain a national restraint, for such power is
unlikely to exist in every local market. Upon analysis, however, the scope of a restraint
indicates its function only weakly.
A generalized restraint may point away from dealer power, for it is unlikely that a
manufacturer restraining distribution in all of its local markets is subject to dealer power
in each of those markets. But a manufacturer subject to dealer power in major markets
may conclude that the simplicity of uniform distribution arrangements outweighs its
losses from using the restraint in those markets where it could be avoided. And dealers
might comply more readily with a restraint that applies equally to all.
In any event, a generalized restraint would not itself disprove an inference of dealer
power based on other factors. Manufacturers employing a formal system of resale price
maintenance have usually applied it generally rather than locally. But a customer or
territorial restraint or a refusal to supply particular local discounters sometimes occurs
on an ad hoc and entirely localized basis. Such a localized restraint may indeed
respond to the power of a local dealer demanding it. On the other hand, such
differences among markets may simply reflect different stages in their evolution.
Pioneering effort may be required in some local markets but not in others. Or the
severity of free-riding problems may vary with the number and aggressiveness of
dealers of the same brand selling within each geographic market and thus vary from
area to area. Without taking such variations into account, interregional comparisons will
be misleading. At most, therefore, a localized restraint in a market that does not
apparently differ from a manufacturer's other markets calls for some explanation or
evidence of its legitimate function—especially in the case of a local system of formal
resale price maintenance.
The form of restraint most likely to reflect dealer power is resale price maintenance.
On the many common products requiring “saturation” distribution, customer and
territorial restraints are simply not suitable. In addition, multibrand dealers, who possess
the more subtle power independently to disadvantage a nonrestraining manufacturer,
are not often suitable for nonprice distribution restraints. Furthermore, resale price
maintenance has in fact been used on products that do not involve the point-of-sale
services that might justify the restraint. Finally, manufacturers have often been observed
to discipline discounters who have not failed to provide the services provided by other
dealers who have complained about the discounts. The reason for such discipline often
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seems obscure, unless a manufacturer fears its brand will be dropped or downgraded
by the complainant and those of similar disposition.
However, there are several respects in which customer or territorial restraints might
indicate a greater likelihood of dealer power. Where nonprice restraints are practiced,
there usually are far fewer dealers in each market than in cases of “saturation”
distribution often found with resale price maintenance. Informal collaboration is easier to
achieve and maintain where the number of dealers is smaller. Also associated with such
restraints are single-brand dealers, who are often organized into associations pursuing
legitimate common interests in joint advertising or in relations with the manufacturer.
Such lawful collaboration may provide a forum or other vehicle for pressuring the
manufacturer. With relatively few dealers, moreover, the restraint may manifest itself
here and there—unlike resale price maintenance, which, if practiced at all, is likely to be
used in all the local markets in which a brand is sold. So informal dealer pressure may
be more of a danger here, and its manifestations may be less obvious to the
enforcement authorities.
All of these inquiries could be avoided if we learn that the intention of the
manufacturer or of dealers was to suppress intrabrand competition for its own sake in
order to serve the anticompetitive interests of dealers. 96 When actual effects are not
known or readily inferred, an anticompetitive purpose indicates probable effects or, at
least, that condemnation would sacrifice no social benefits. A known anticompetitive
intention is thus probative but difficult to see. Perhaps a manufacturer's file will disclose
that a distribution restraint has been adopted solely in response to dealer power, but
that would be a rare find. Dealer files are apt to be highly ambiguous. For example, a
dealer's intention to enhance its profits is not only the usual motive of business persons
but is entirely consistent with the procompetitive functions of distribution restraints.
A restraint that is no more intensive than necessary to serve a legitimate
manufacturer interest cannot be serving antimanufacturer dealer interests in excess
profit or the quiet life. 98 Such a justification need not be weighed to determine whether it
offsets “dealer power,” for it means that dealer interests simply do not account for the
restraint at all.
Observe that the dealer power explanation for a vertical restraint is not disproved
merely by showing that the restraint promotes a legitimate manufacturer's goal, for the
manufacturer's might otherwise have chosen a less restrictive way to achieve that goal.
To exclude dealer power altogether, the business problem addressed by the restraint
must be significant, and the restraint must solve it better than any less restrictive
alternative available to the manufacturer. Unfortunately, the evidence on these matters
will seldom allow the tribunal to make a confident judgment. Accordingly, the legal rules
96

See Donald I. Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to Where?, 44
Antitrust L.J. 537, 545 (1975) (suggesting that restraints that are intended to eliminate price cutting
should be condemned). See also Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1978).
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Of course, a distribution restraint desired by a manufacturer may bring excess dealer profits as an
incidental spillover.
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will have to specify what each party has to prove.
Of course, if the defenders of a restraint were merely required to come forward with
some evidence of a plausible justification without having to persuade the tribunal on this
issue, much dealer power would probably survive. So long as there are many
theoretically valid efficiencies associated with vertical restraints, at least one of those
offered by a particular defendant will often appear plausible. Nevertheless, at least
those restraints without any plausible justification—such as those on homogeneous
goods like sugar or on some convenience goods like toothpaste—would fail. In any
event, if requiring some evidence of justification were the only consequence of finding
that dealer power is a danger, weak indications of the danger should suffice to create a
prima facie case. Strong indicators of dealer power might require more of a restraint's
defenders—perhaps persuasion of the tribunal that the restraint serves a significant and
legitimate function. Policy judgments about the different classes of restraints would then
determine whether the defenders should also have to persuade the tribunal that a less
restrictive alternative suggested by the challenger is significantly more costly or less
effective.
Conclusion
Our underlying concern about dealer power does not itself support a per se rule for
the general run of vertical restraints cases or even for resale price maintenance. Dealer
power is not itself sufficiently ubiquitous to justify total prohibition of any type of
distribution restraint. At the other pole, organized dealer requests, powerful individual
dealers, and constrained manufacturer choice remain enough of a danger to reject a
rule of total legality for distribution restraints. In between lie many options.
Requiring the plaintiff to prove that the challenged restraint is explained solely and
exclusively on cartel, dealer power, or other non-efficiency grounds would be an
attractive policy option for those who think such instances are rare. This option allows
prompt validation of many such restraints. On the other hand, requiring the defenders to
offer a plausible and legitimate business reason for every restraint would allow the
antitrust tribunal easily to condemn those restraints obviously lacking justification but
would complicate many cases in which dealer power is unlikely. Depending on the
restraint, challengers might be required to prove specified indicia of dealer power, or, for
legally less favored restraints, such power might be presumed subject to rebuttal by
disproof of the same specified indicia. If the challengers prevail at that initial stage, it
would have to be decided what other rebuttals (such as legitimate functions) would be
allowed and with what proofs.
What suffices to indicate dealer power depends, of course, on the consequences. A
plausible consequence is that the defendant must offer some evidence that the restraint
serves a legitimate function; the defendant might even bear the burden of persuasion on
this issue when the inference of dealer power appears especially strong.
Although multibrand dealers might seem especially able to coerce new entrants—
either new firms or, to a lesser extent, old firms introducing a new product and
expanding into new market areas— condemning the coerced restraint in such cases
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might make new entry even more difficult and thus worsen rather than improve
competition. Therefore, the usual rules designed to cope with dealer power might be
suspended for a few years in the case of new entrants.

